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1 Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that the relatively stable industrial relations system that was
predominant throughout the post-war period in the United States is undergoing a period of crisis
and transformation. 1 One of the most important aspects of that system which has become unsettled
is the structure of wage increases: cost of living adjustments and predetermined annual
improvement factors based on rules are progressively being abandoned or readjusted. This paper
presents evidence on the prevalence of the innovations that are replacing the traditional systems of
wage determination in the union sector and analyzes one of them, lump sum bonuses, in depth
because of its growing diffusion and relative neglect by researchers. Lump sum bonuses are
payments not explicitly tied to any measure of performance that are given instead of all or part of a
base wage increase; in the union sector, these payments are contracted in advance and given at
specific dates along the life of the contract. These bonus systems could represent minor, or even
just semantic, modifications of the existing methods of wage determination. Or, they may evolve
into something radically different from the basic compensation system that dominated the post-war
period, with consequent implications for macro- and micro-economic performance. As a first step
toward addressing this larger issue, we examine the basic nature and possible causes of bonus
systems. Our main findings are that the existence of an uncertain environment increases the
probability of signing a bonus contract, and that bonus contracts provide for larger growth in total
compensation than straight wage contracts adopted under similar circumstances. These results
suggest that bonus systems can best be understood as pay increases on which the firm maintains an
option of non-renewal, and for which present workers must be compensated.
First, in section 2, we present basic information on bonus contracts and on the bargaining
units that adopt them based on our sample of 455 manufacturing settlements. Next, in section 3,
we suggest several hypotheses about the nature and causes of bonus systems. Finally, in section
4, we present econometric evidence designed to distinguish among these hypotheses.
2 Recent innovations in compensation systems
The innovations in compensation systems that have begun to replace automatic cost of
living adjustments and annual improvement factor wage increases can be placed into the seven
broad categories presented in Table 1.2 In this section we examine their prevalence and argue that
we have chosen to focus on one of them, lump sum bonuses, because its use has accelerated much
1 For a comprehensive analysis of this evidence, see Kochan, Katz and McKersie[1986].
2 A similar classification is given in O'Dell [1986], p. 24.
2more than any of the other systems and because it has been neglected by researchers until now.
The seven innovations can be summarized as follows. As stated above, lump sum bonuses are
payments not explicitly tied to any measure of performance that are given instead of all or part of a
base wage increase. Incentive systems can be divided into profit sharing, gain sharing, small unit
incentives, and individual incentives, which tie pay to company performance, large unit
performance, small unit performance, and individual performance, respectively. Two tier plans
require that new hires enter at a lower rate of pay than employees previously hired to fill those
jobs. Finally, pay for knowledge means that pay is determined by the number of jobs an employee
can do, not the job actually performed on a given day.
TABLE 1: Prevalence of Non-Traditional Compensation Systems in US Economy
SURVEY AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY CENTER HAY GROUP
1986 1988
firms using firms considering firms using finns considering
Lump Sum Bonuses 30 % 9% 24% 14%
Profit Sharing 32% 6% 29% 7%
Individual Incentives 28 % 8 % 47 % 13 %
Small Unit Incentives 14% 9% 18% 12%
Gain Sharing 13% 9% 10% 12%
Two Tier 11 % 4% 9% 2%
Pay For Knowledge 5% 4% 10% 8%
Unfortunately, the U.S. government does not systematically keep track of the prevalence of
all these systems, and collects virtually no data at all on the non-union sector. Private
organizations do conduct surveys, however, and Table 1 reports results from two of these. The
American Productivity Center is a non-profit organization which undertook a survey of 1,598
organizations representing about 10% of the civilian working population of the U.S. in forty
different industry groups in 1986; the Hay Group is a management consulting firm which
undertook (with the magazine BusinessWeek) a survey of 688 companies in 1988.3 Both surveys
indicate that bonus and incentive systems are significant factors in the U.S. economy; note that
3 The data in Table 1 comes from Hay[1989] and O'Dell[1986].
3both also indicate that lump sum bonus systems are being considered for adoption by as many or
more companies than are considering any of the other innovations.
More systematic evidence exists on the union sector. The main finding from here is that
lump sum bonus provisions were almost unheard of for non-managerial workers before the 1980s,
but have become commonplace recently. The Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) is a private
organization which keeps track of all published union contracts for firms with more than 500
employees; they report that only 6% of the new contracts negotiated in 1984 had lump sum
provisions while 19% had these provisions in 1985, 33% in 1986, 32% in 1987, and 36% in
1988.4 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that by the first half of 1989, 42% of all
private sector workers under major collective bargaining settlements were covered by lump sum
provisions 5; before 1982, they did not account for these payments as a separate category because
they were so rare.
We know of no evidence of any other compensation system which has grown so much
recently or appears to show such continued growth, and so we turn our attention to the lump sum
bonus phenomenon as a key compensation innovation in U.S. union contracts. Once again, in the
union sector a lump sum bonus is defined as a contracted payment which does not go into the
hourly base wage and which is not explicitly tied to individual, group, or company performance;
many contracts specify more than one bonus payment over the life of the contract, but the amount
and the timing of the bonuses are always specified at signing6. Before discussing hypotheses
about the nature and the causes of bonus systems, we will first provide some basic information
about their characteristics and about the bargaining units that adopt them: the form bonuses take,
their average size, the industries they appear in, and their pattern of diffusion. Accordingly, we
now turn to our sample of union contracts in large U.S. firms.
Our sample consists of 455 manufacturing settlements between 1982 and 1988. The data
ultimately comes from the BLS. 7 Information on the size of the average base wage, average wage
4 BNA[1988]
5 BLS[1989]
6 To give two examples of lump sum provisions from the data set that will be used in the following
pages:
- The Zenith Radio Corporation signed a three year agreement with the electrical workers' union
(IBEW) in 12/86 providing for a $750 payment in 12/86 and $700 payments in 12/87 and 12/88.
- The Lockheed Georgia Company signed a three year agreement with the machinists' union (IAM) in
10/86 providing for a payment in 12/86 equal to 12% of the employee's earnings during the preceding 12
months and payments in 12/87 and 12/88 equal to 5% of earnings during the preceding 12 months.
(Data from the BLS)
7 The original data set is from Vroman and Abowd [1988], with significant modifications made by
Hirtle [1986]. The original source of the data was the BLS publication Current Wage Developments. The
lump sum information comes from a separate BLS data source. We are grateful to Henry Farber at M.I.T.,
John Abowd at Cornell, and Janice Murphy at the BLS for giving us access to the various parts of the data
set.
4increase, and sizes and timing of bonuses are included, as well as other characteristics of the
bargaining group and the settlement such as the region, industry and union, the number of
workers, and whether the contract was preceded by a strike. All 20 of the two-digit manufacturing
industries are covered. We choose 1982 as the starting date because this is the first year in which
the BLS began to account for lump sum bonuses as a separate category.
66 of the settlements contain bonus provisions; the time pattern of their adoption is
presented in Table 2. Note that our sample confirms the finding of the BNA that the adoption of
bonus systems has accelerated greatly in the past few years. This trend is even more dramatic
when we calculate the percentage of workers in new settlements with bonus provisions. Once
again, we conclude that the bonus phenomenon is a recent and widespread innovation.
TABLE 2: Incidence of Lump Sum Provisions in Sample of Union Contracts
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
% OF CONTRACTS
WITH LUMP SUM 0 2.7 11.9 23.2 31.6 34.9 50
PROVISIONS
% OF WORKERS
N NEW SETTLEMENTS 0 9.7 83.1 40.5 49.8 77.5 58.3
WITH LUMP SUM
PROVISIONS
% OF WORKERS
NEW SETTLEMENTS 0 9.7 40 40.5 49.8 38.5 58.3
WITH LUMP SUM
PROVISIONS,
EXCLUDING
FORD & GM
Table 3 presents the basic characteristics of the bonus provisions themselves. We judge
two categorizations to be relevant for the hypotheses that will be discussed below: whether the
initial bonus is up-front or deferred and whether the bonus comes as a uniform dollar amount for
all workers or as a percentage of earnings. The up-front versus deferred distinction is interesting
because it suggests why bonuses may be attractive to workers given their discount rates and
probability of future turnover or layoff; we define an up-front contract as one in which the first
bonus comes within two months of the signing of the contract. The uniform versus percentage
distinction is interesting because of the implications for within-firm wage dispersion. Note that
while the bonus systems in our sample seem to be evenly split between uniform amount and
percentage of earnings, most of the provisions provided for at least the first portion of the bonus
5payment to come up front. Note also that the bonuses were not insubstantial sums, ranging from
$150 to $2120 for uniform bonuses and from 1.5% to 12% of the previous year's earnings for
percentage bonuses; the last column gives the average bonus payment per hour of the contract.8
TABLE 3: Characteristics of Bonuses
AVERAGE AVERAGE
TYPE OF BONUS # OF CONTRACTS AMOUNT OF BONUS AMOUNT OF BONUS
($) ($ / HOUR)
UP-FRONT, UNIFORM 28 $1210 $0.21
DEFERRED, UNIFORM 8 $1080 $0.19
UP-FRONT, PERCENTAGE 22 $2140 $0.36
EFERRED, PERCENTAGE 8 $1300 $0.23
Table 4 presents some summary statistics on the differences between bonus and traditional
settlements. The median number of workers is higher for bonus settlements, they are more likely
to be preceded by a strike and to contain escalator and profit sharing provisions, and they are more
likely to operate at the national level. Table 5 shows the distribution of these settlements across
industries. The transportation equipment and petroleum industries seem to have a disproportionate
share of these contracts, although at least one such contract has appeared in all but six of the twenty
two-digit industries.
TABLE 4: Characteristics of Settlements in Sample
VARIABLE LUMP SUM NON- LUMP SUM
MEDIAN # OF WORKERS 6,300 2,200
% OF CONTRACTS 13.6 % 7.4 %
PRECEDED BY STRIKE
% OF CONTRACTS WITH 59.1% 44.1%
ESCALATORS
% OF CONTRACTS 15.2 % 4.6 %
WITH PROFIT SHARING
% OF CONTRACTS FROM
FIRMS OPERATING AT 54.5 % 30.4 %
NATIONAL LEVEL
Union contracts in the U.S. are typically three years long.8
6TABLE 5: Lump Sum Settlements by Industry
INDUSTRY TOTAL % OF CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS WITH LUMP SUMS
SIC 20: FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 37 11 %
SIC 21: TOBACCO PRODUCTS 5 20 %
SIC 22: TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 37 0
SIC 23: APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 26 0
SIC 24: LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 18 0
SIC 25: FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 8 13 %
SIC 26: PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 38 21 %
SIC 27: PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 11 0
SIC 28: CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 33 3 %
SIC 29: PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 12 33 %
SIC 30: RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 14 7 %
SIC 31: LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 8 0
SIC 32: STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 20 10 %
SIC 33: PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 28 4 %
SIC 34: FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 19 21 %
SIC 35: MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 25 12 %
SIC 36: ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 43 23 %
SIC 37: TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 44 55 %
SIC 38: INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 9 22 %
SIC 39: MISC. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 9 0
3 Hypotheses about the nature and causes of bonus systems
A reading of the industrial relations environment reveals two apparent facts: management
tends to view bonus systems as tools to lower labor costs, and unions generally oppose them. In a
separate report from the one mentioned above, the Hay Group describes bonuses as follows:
"Lump sum payments in lieu of base wage increases are a tactic that first gained reluctant
acceptance in collective bargaining agreements, in industries where all parties recognized the need
to become more competitive. Effectively, base wages are frozen but employees still have periodic
lump sum payments to look forward to." 9 Interviews with personnel managers have confirmed
this view - that bonus systems are perceived as serving to bring base wages into line with some
lower standard. On the union side, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union comment in their
newsletter that "Lump sum bonuses are part of a management strategy to eventually pay non-union
wages in a union shop. The lump sum bonus ... is not really a bonus at all - it's a delayed wage
increase that does not add to the sum of our base wage. It's a lousy wage increase because it
doesn't accrue and build our base wage as an hourly increase does." 10 Interviews with union
leaders have indicated that bonuses are generally opposed in principle as concessionary. These
9
10
Hay Group [1987].
Braxton [1989], p. 8.
7considerations suggest as a first approximation that bonuses are just a one-shot tactic to avoid
raising wages.
Yet, there is also another side of the story. In the just mentioned report, the Hay Group
goes on to state that "With each subsequent year, the relief [for the company] becomes
cumulatively greater, and the possibility of larger lump sum awards grows"11 (emphasis added);
this suggests that bonuses may not be perceived by firms as one-shot tactics and could in fact
persist and become a significant portion of pay. On the union side, interviews with people in the
labor movement have indicated that the rank-and-file, particularly younger workers, do not
necessarily oppose bonus systems to the extent the leadership does. Furthermore, some of the less
dogmatic union leaders, while opposing bonuses in principle, appreciate that there may be
circumstances under which they are appropriate, and many view explicit profit sharing much more
favorably. For example, one union leader told us that he was willing to accept that some pay
should come in the form of a bonus when the company does not know whether or not its product
market environment will allow it to pay the same wages in the future. In addition, it is not clear
that the bonus itself (the form of payment) is opposed so much as its perceived tendency to
accompany cuts in growth in total compensation (the size of the total settlement). These
observations suggest that the lump sum bonus phenomenon might not be transitory after all, and
opens up a range of questions about the basic nature of these systems and the conditions under
which they are adopted.
Unfortunately, it is too early to answer definitively the most interesting question: are bonus
systems only temporary tactics which will be replaced by the old system of automatic base wage
increases once the real base rate has been sufficiently reduced, or will they evolve into something
else like explicit incentive or profit sharing systems? It does seem difficult to believe that they can
continue in their present form indefinitely, given the near across-the-board opposition of the unions
to these systems. We also cannot yet say with confidence whether bonuses are more easily taken
away than wage increases, although we can say that this seems to be the perception of the parties
involved. What we can do is to describe possible scenarios which define the basic nature of
bonuses and the conditions under which they may be likely to appear and present empirical
evidence which provides clues as to which of the scenarios best approximates reality.
SCENARIO I: The bonus system is in fact identical to the wage system and bonuses are nothing
more than a semantic change, with no effects on payoffs in the bargaining process.
This scenario is based on the assumption that a dollar is a dollar and it does not matter what
form the payment takes. Rational agents should be able to see through any difference in the form of
11 Hay group [1987]
8payment, and a union with given bargaining power should be able to extract the same amount from
the firm regardless of whether it comes in the form of wage increases or bonuses. This implies
that the amount of money that each worker gets under a bonus contract must be exactly equal to the
present discounted value, over the life of the contract, of what he/she would have gotten under the
wage system. This explanation also requires that bonuses are no more easily taken away than wage
increases and that unions can just as easily demand a compounded growth in the bonus as in the
wage. The empirically testable implication of this scenario is that, within each contract, after
controlling for the characteristics of the bargaining unit, the compensation package under the bonus
system should be identical to the compensation package under the wage system; we cannot yet
adequately test for whether the bonus is more easily taken away in the next contract, however.
This scenario is clearly unsatisfactory. First of all, it does not give us any hint about why a
merely semantic change should be favored by the firm, given that labor costs would be the same
under both systems if this were the true explanation. Even more, it does not explain why these
systems should be becoming so prevalent in U.S union contracts, as we have shown above.
Finally, this explanation does not tell us why unions should oppose bonuses so strongly.
SCENARIO II: Bonus systems are worth less than wage systems adopted under similar
circumstances, even within the life of a single contract.
This scenario implies that firms face lower labor costs under bonus systems within each
contract. It requires the assumption that workers either do not perceive this cut in wages or have
higher discount rates than the firm. To give an example of the first possibility, a personnel
manager told us that the workers in his plant accepted a bonus system because they did not
understand that three yearly wage increases will compound, while three bonus payments will not.
Along the same lines, workers may not perceive the amount of money that they lose due to the fact
that bonuses do not go into the base on which overtime and some benefits (such as pensions) are
calculated; hence, a package which might seem like a fair deal to the worker might in fact represent
a cost savings to the firm. 12 As for the discount rate argument, the firm may save on labor costs
within each contract by exploiting the preferences of workers for large sums of money immediately
rather than wage increases spread over time which add up to more money when discounted at the
market rate of interest. The empirically testable implication of this scenario is that, within each
contract, after controlling for the characteristics of the bargaining unit, the compensation package
under the bonus system should be worth less than the compensation package under the wage
system.
12 The same argument is presented on the union side in Braxton [1989].
9This scenario does have its merits. It gives a satisfactory explanation for why firms should
favor bonus systems, and is consistent with some anecdotal evidence: bonuses do tend to be
loaded up front, and union leaders have told us that it is difficult to generate a strike against a new
compensation system which promises a big check upon signing. However, on the firm side it
does not explain why bonus systems have only appeared recently. On the union side, if the
compounding or benefits story is true, why do the unions fail to inform their workers of these
effects before ratification; if the discount story is true, why do union leaders oppose these systems
if they meet the preferences of the rank and file? Note that the two motivations for this explanation
give different predictions about the permanence of bonus systems: if compounding is the issue,
then one would expect that workers will eventually see the trick and bonus systems will disappear;
while if discount rates are at work, then in some sense a fair trade is occurring and bonus systems
could persist.
SCENARIO III: Bonuses can be cut in future contracts much more easily than wages: hence, firms
must pay for this "option of non-renewal"
This scenario requires an institutional or psychological reason to explain why it is more
difficult to cut nominal wages than to fail to renew a bonus in future contracts. Anecdotal and
scholarly evidence suggests that this is in fact the case. 13 Taking this for granted, a bonus system
can be designed so as to provide the same present discounted value of lifetime earnings as a wage
system adopted under similar circumstances. This implies that, in order to compensate workers for
the higher probability that the bonus will be taken away in the future, the firm must pay more
money over the life of a bonus contract than over the life of a wage contract adopted under similar
circumstances. The empirically testable implication of this scenario is that, within each contract,
after controlling for the characteristics of the bargaining unit, the compensation package under the
bonus system should be worth more than the compensation package under the wage system.
There are several possible reasons why the firm, the workers, or the union might favor or
oppose a bonus contract which pays more than the alternative straight wage contract in the present
13 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary[1973] defines "bonus" as: (1). Something given in addition to
what is usually or strictly due, (2). Money or an equivalent given in addition to an employee's usual
compensation.
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986] report the following results from a telephone survey of 198
Canadians in 1984-85: When people were posed the following question: "A small company employs
several people. The workers' incomes have been about average for the community. In recent months,
business for the company has not increased as it has before. The owners reduce the workers' wages by 10%
for the next year," the responses were: acceptable 39%, unfair 61%. However, when a separate group was
asked: "A small company employs several people. The workers have been receiving a 10% annual bonus
each year and their total incomes have been about average for the community. In recent months, business
for the company has not increased as it had before. The owners eliminate the workers' bonus for the year,"
the responses were: acceptable 80%, unfair 20%.
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contract but less in expected value terms in future contracts. We now examine three such
explanations.
III.a) The adoption of the bonus contract is related to uncertainty about future performance of the
firm.
This modification of the basic "option" scenario is based on the assumption that the bonus
is more easily taken away than a wage increase when the firm is facing a downturn, so that an
increase in the perceived probability of the occurrence of bad states should make the bonus system
more desirable to the firm. If we further assume that the firm's labor demand is elastic with respect
to wages, not only the firm but also the workers could benefit from this increase in wage
flexibility: models of the labor market such as the one presented in Weitzman[1984] indicate that a
decrease in employment induced by a shock to demand or to non-labor costs could be neutralized
by wage flexibility. 14 In short, the gain induced by the shift to a bonus system could be positive
sum for both the workers and the firm.
If, on the other hand, we assume that union wage determination simply involves the
division of ample and exogenously determined rents so that the firm's employment decision is
unrelated to the wage, any gain to the firm from increased wage flexibility should represent an
equal loss to the union. Yet, it is still possible that uncertainty matters if the firm has more
complete information than the union about the future performance of the company or the firm
interprets the commonly available information differently. Under this type of assumption, suppose
that a firm perceives for the future an environment that is more uncertain than the one faced in the
past; in other words, suppose that it becomes increasingly more difficult to forecast the size of the
pie to be split with the workers in the future. If this perception is not shared by the union, the firm
should find it advantageous to shift to a bonus system that would fully compensate workers if
uncertainty were at the lower level perceived by the union, but in fact increases the profits expected
by the firm on the basis of its different perception about future variability of performance. Again,
the key assumption of this scenario is that there is a range of "bad states" over which the firm can
exercise the option of non-renewal on a bonus but cannot cut the base wage in future contracts.
The empirically testable implications of this scenario are twofold: first, the probability of
signing lump sum bonus contracts should be increasing with some measure of uncertainty about
the future performance of the firm. In addition, as with the more general option scenario, within
each contract, after controlling for the characteristics of the bargaining unit, the compensation
package under the bonus system should be worth more than the compensation package under the £
14 This explanation begins to blur the distinction between bonus systems and explicit profit sharing;
perhaps bonus systems just allow workers to trade off wage stability for employment stability in the long-
run (i.e. over the course of the next contract) while profit sharing provides this tradeoff in the shorter-run.
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wage system. Clearly, however, it is impossible to determine empirically if the larger within-
contract compensation package under the bonus system fully compensates workers for the
uncertainty concerning future contracts perceived by the firm.
This scenario, compared to those described above, seems to have one substantial merit: not
only does it explain why firms may favor bonuses systems, but it also gives some clue about the
reasons for the increasing prevalence of these innovations in the eighties. It has been argued by
Piore and Sabel[1984], among others, that the postwar period up to the seventies was a period of
relative stability for the U.S. economy, and that this stable environment allowed for the viability of
the more rigid compensation system described above (based on fixed annual improvement factors
and cost of living adjustments), while at the same time the compensation system was in itself a part
of the regulatory mechanism that helped to maintain the stability of the environment. The late
seventies and the eighties have been periods of greater uncertainty for U.S. companies. Yet, a
different kind of uncertainty is at play now than in the late seventies. Before Reagan and in the
aftermath of the oil shocks, the issue was uncertainty about prices, and in general nominal
variables such as interest rates, due to the inflationary environment. In the eighties, the various
attempts to deregulate the economy and to reduce the presence of the state in the market, the sky-
rocketing federal deficit, and the increasing foreign penetration in U.S. markets have all created
different sources of uncertainty. In particular, it can be argued that U.S. companies have
encountered situations in which elements such as these have affected their market shares in not
easily predictable ways. Those specific situations, which are likely to have affected different
companies in different periods, may have caused the perception of increasing uncertainty
hypothesized here.
However, this scenario is still unsatisfactory for one key reason: it does not explain the
strong opposition of unions to bonuses. According to the assumptions above, the firm is in fact
able to design a bonus system that fully compensates workers given their perception of the future.
Yet, unions tend to oppose bonuses in principle. The following scenario addresses this issue of
union opposition.
III.b The firm exploits the fact that yet-to-be hired workers will not receive the bonus if it is not
renewed, while workers with low expected tenure favor the bonus system because they expect to
leave.
Starting from the basic option value story outlined in scenario III, here we assume that the
existing workforce has a shorter time horizon than the firm and the union, which both take into
account workers who will be hired in the future. Under these circumstances, the firm may find it
profitable to propose a bonus system that fully compensates the existing workforce but leaves the
expected base wage lower than under the equivalent wage system. The higher profit to the firm
12
would be due to the fact that such a bonus system would amount to a subtle way of introducing a
two tier wage system in which workers hired in the future, when the bonus is not paid, would
essentially receive a lower compensation package than the one received by older workers. The
latter would have received in the past the compensation that they do not get in the future, while
newly hired workers would simply be paid less. Note that, in contrast to explicit two-tier systems,
at any given moment in time new workers earn the same wage as older workers, perhaps leading to
a less disruptive work environment. 15
In addition, note that not all existing workers will gain equally from the shift to a bonus
system. If young and low tenure workers perceive a higher probability of quitting or being laid off
because of greater turnover at the beginning of their careers and because of seniority rules, they
will put more value on money guaranteed in the present contract against money promised in future
contracts. Furthermore, when the bonus comes in the form of a uniform dollar amount for all of
the workforce as often seems to be the case16, low tenure workers receive a proportionally higher
compensation increase because they start from a lower base wage. Finally, young workers are less
likely to participate in some benefits related to the base wage such as pensions and medical
payments. On the other hand, older workers who expect to retire soon also have low expected
tenure and so might also favor money in the present contract over money promised in the future
when they will be gone. Given these differences in the way workers regard bonuses, in addition to
playing off present employees against future employees, the firm might use bonus systems to cut
its costs by benefiting only part of the present workforce at the expense of the others.
In short, the firm can cut its costs either by making present workers better off at the
expense of yet-to-be-hired workers or by splitting the present workforce. However, unless we
assume the existence of a fixed cost of changing systems, perhaps in the form of worker
dissatisfaction with the concept of change, bonuses would always be a dominant strategy for the
firn and at least part of the workforce. Given that we do not observe bonuses everywhere, these
fixed costs are likely to be at play and so some other condition must be met for the appearance of
bonuses. One such condition could be an increase in uncertainty about the firm's performance: if
fixed costs exist, when uncertainty increases the value of the innovation to the firm increases,
raising the likelihood that those fixed costs will be overcome. One would also expect that bonus
systems would have a higher value to firms that are expanding, and thus are likely to soon reap the
15 The Hay Group[1987] points out another sense in which lump sum payments may reduce the
disruptive environment created by a two-tier wage system. They note that "the lump sum tactic is usually
the smoothest way to integrate [an explicit] two-tier wage structure. Under this approach, new employees
are hired at lower rates than existing employees are receiving for the same positions. In most cases, the
senior employees are effectively frozen at the old rates (or put into lump sum programs), while the gap
between the new and the old tiers is gradually closed."
16 See Table 3, p. 5.
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benefits of the implicit two-tier system upon hiring new workers. 17
The empirically testable implications of this scenario are fourfold: first, as in scenario Ila,
uncertainty should positively affect the probability of signing bonus contracts. Secondly, a proxy
for an expansionary firm environment, indicating the likelihood of hiring in the near future, should
also positively affect the probability of signing bonus contracts. Thirdly, firms with more young
and low expected tenure workers should be more likely to adopt these innovations. Finally, as in
the other variants of the option value story, the bonus contract should provide more money within
the life of the agreement than wage contracts signed under similar circumstances.
This scenario gives an explanation for why some workers might accept bonus contracts
while unions oppose them: union leaders are likely to care about those workers who will be hired
in the future and will bear the cost of the innovation in the event that the firm exercises the option
of non-renewal 18. In addition, this scenario shares the same merits as the previous one, Ila, as
far as relying on uncertainty to explain the recent increasing prevalence of bonuses. On the other
hand, it seems unlikely that firms would slight workers who expect to stay with the company a
long time and yet-to-be-hired workers at the expense of those present workers who expect to leave,
as long as there is some perceived relationship between wages and the quality of the workforce 19 :
the gain from cutting labor costs in this way may well be overwhelmed by the losses due to the
effect on morale and effort of part of the present and future workforce. Finally, this explanation is
based either on expectations of an expansionary environment or on uncertainty independent from
the level of present and expected future performance, while anecdotal evidence suggests that the
parties involved tend to associate these systems with situations of firm or industry crisis when
concessions are imposed on workers.
III.c) In a situation in which the union is forced to take concessions and the fixed costs of shifting
away from tradition have to be paid anyway, a bonus system may be preferred by workers to a
concessionary wagre contract.
As we said at the end of the previous scenario Ib, the story based on the firm and existing
workers gaining from bonus systems at the expense of yet-to-be-hired workers does not tell us
why these systems might be more likely to appear in a concessionary environment. Suppose,
17 The existence of queues for union jobs, which generally pay much higher wages than similar non-
union jobs, probably rules out the possibility that the jobs would go unfilled at a slightly lower rate of
compensation. For an analysis of queues for union jobs, see Farber[1983]. Of course, if the wage is used
as a recruitment device to find more qualified workers, this issue becomes more complicated.
18 This may be motivated by a higher sense of solidarity and participation in the cause on the part of
union leaders, or, in a more greedy and rational world, it could be due to the fact that union leaders have to
get reelected in the future. By making their opposition to bonuses clear, they gain the right credentials to
represent newly hired workers in the future
19 E.G. efficiency wage theory, and wages as a recruitment device to find qualified workers.
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however, that the fixed cost of change comes more from an aversion to change in-and-of itself
rather than to shifting away from one ideal type of system to a different one. Under this
assumption, if the firm is hit by shocks that make the old base wage dynamic incompatible with
expected performance, independent from uncertainty, the bargaining unit will incur the fixed cost
anyway because a lower than customary wage growth is imposed by the situation.20 Hence, for a
given level of uncertainty, bonus systems should be more likely to be adopted in a concessionary
environment because the fixed cost of shifting away from the traditional system is less relevant.
Note that despite the fact that some present workers might prefer the bonus system, union leaders
on behalf of future workers would still likely oppose bonuses for the same reasons outlined in the
scenario IIIb. In this case, future workers hired after the firm exercises the option of non-renewal
would essentially take a larger concession than the one taken by present workers when the bonus
system is introduced. Yet, if many current workers are either indifferent or prefer the bonus system
once it is agreed that concessions have to be taken, union leaders may not be able to gain enough
support from the rank and file to fight the innovation.
Empirically, this scenario is distinguishable from the previous one because now, for any
given level of uncertainty, a proxy for the existence of a concessionary environment rather than an
expansionary environment should positively affect the probability of signing bonus contracts. In
addition, as with the above scenario IIb, firms with young and low tenure workers and firms that
face high uncertainty should be more likely to adopt these innovations. Finally, as in all the
variants of the option value story, the bonus contract should provide more money, within the life
of the agreement, than wage contracts signed under similar circumstances.
The scenarios outlined above have different empirical implications that allow us in principle
to distinguish among them in the data. These implications are summarized in Table 6. However, at
this stage of our research, we do not yet have all of the empirical information needed to adequately
evaluate these differences; furthermore, given the very recent appearance of bonus systems, any
attempt to estimate their permanence in the future or their possible evolution is seriously
compromised. However, the use of econometric techniques with our data set allows us to get hints
about which of these scenarios is most accurate. More generally, we are able to address the
following two fundamental questions:
(1) Do bonus agreements provide to workers more, less, or the same amount of money as
traditional contracts adopted under similar circumstances?
(2) Under what types of circumstances are bonus systems adopted?
20 Suppose, for example, that the workers have always received "3% plus COLA", which is one
stylization of the post-war regime. If the company can no longer give 3% and remain viable, is it that
much more of a change to also alter the fqrm of payment?
15
TABLE 6: Empirical Implications of the Scenarios
Scenario Determinants of the probability of Determinants of
signing a lump sum contract compensation
growth
Proxy for Proxy for Proxy for Proxy for Presence of
uncertainty expected expansionary concessionary lump sum
tenure environment environment provisions
Scenario I: bonuses are no effect no effect no effect no effect Bonus contracts
a semantic modification payhe smne as
wage contracts under
similar conditions
Scenario II: bonus no effect no effect no effect no effect Bonus contracts
contracts are worth less pay less than
due to differences in wage contracts under
discounting or ignorance similar conditions
Scenario III: bonus Bonus contracts
contracts include the pay more than
option of non-renewal wage contracts under
similar conditions
a) uncertainty about increases no effect no effect no effect "
the future increases probability of
the value of flexibility bonus contract
b) the firm and present increases increases increases no effect
workers, particularly probability of probability of probability of
those with low expected bonus contract bonus contract bonus contract
enure, gain at the expense
of future workers
c) fixed costs of changing increases increases no effect increases
form of the compensation probability of probability of probability of
system are more easily bonus contract bonus contract bonus contract
>vercome in concessionar3
environments
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Do bonus agreements provide to workers more, less or the same amount of money as
traditional contracts adopted under similar circumstances?
The purpose of this section is to attempt to distinguish among the three basic scenarios by
determining how much money workers get under bonus contracts compared to wage contracts
adopted under similar circumstances. Our testing procedure allows us to reject the hypothesis that
workers are paid less. Hence, we conclude that the adoption of a bonus system is most likely not
just a short-run tactic to cut labor costs within the present contract, but rather a more sophisticated
arrangement such that any cost savings for the firm can only result from failing to renew the bonus
in subsequent agreements.
Starting from sample comparisons, Table 7 presents the wage characteristics of the
settlements.
TABLE 7: Wage Characteristics of Settlements in Sample (standard deviations in parentheses)
0
21 Includes bonuses in previous contract.
VARIABLE LUMP SUM NON- LUMP SUM
$/hour % of signing pay $/hour % of signing pay
($ 1983) per year ($ 1983) per year
AVG. HOURLY PAY 11.04 9.33
AT SIGNING2 1  (1.63) (2.38)
AVG. WAGE INCREASE 0.38 1.3 0.65 3.1
(0.38) (1.1) (0.83) (3.6)
AVG. COLA INCREASE 0.46 1.3 0.20 0.6
(0.51) (1.5) (0.35) (1.1)
AVG. COLA + WAGE
INCREASE 0.84 2.6 0.85 3.7
(0.54) (1.4) (0.88) (3.6)
AVG. BONUS INCREASE 0.24 0.7
(0.18) (0.5)
AVG. INCREASE IN
TOTAL COMPENSATION 1.08 3.3 0.85 3.7
(0.59) (1.5) (0.88) (3.6)
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On average, non-lump sum contracts provide for a 3.7% annual growth in wages,
including COLA provisions, over the life of the contract, while lump sum contracts provide for a
2.6% annual growth in wages.22 The average bonus increase is 0.7%, so that the average growth
in total compensation is lower in bonus contracts. This finding should not, however, be taken at
face value: it does not address the more interesting question of whether a bonus contract gives
more or less money than a wage contract adopted by a similar company in a similar environment in
.a particular year; i.e. it does not isolate the effect of the bonus from other factors at work in the
economy, in particular industries or in particular companies. We can hold these factors constant by
using econometric techniques.
Accordingly, we propose the following procedure to test the three basic scenarios presented
above. Let Aw be the annual growth rate of nominal take-home pay (wages and bonuses) over the
life of the contract.23 Let is be a dummy variable equal to one if the contract contains a lump sum
bonus provision, zero otherwise. Let fr be the fraction of total compensation accounted for by the
bonus. Consider the following regressions:
(I) Aw = x$1 + ails + El
(II) Aw = x$ 2 + c 2fr + E2
where x is a matrix of industry, region, and year dummies, as well as a constant and other labor
market, institutional, and expectational variables which might influence the size of collective
bargaining settlements.
The above three scenarios about the nature of bonuses correspond to the following
hypotheses on al or a2:
Scenario I: ai = 0
Scenario II: ai < 0
Scenario III: cc > 0
22 For Table 7 and the wage regressions which follow, total COLA payments for incomplete contracts
were calculated by projecting the realized COLA at the point the data was collected until the end of the
contract using the DRI inflation forecast at the time of writing, assuming that the same relationship
between the rate of inflation and the size of the COLA payment would hold from the time of data collection
until the end of the contract as from the time of signing until the date of data collection. This might
introduce a bias to the extent that COLAs are front-loaded and caps on COLA payments are present. Recall
from table 4 that lump-sum contracts are more likely to contain COLA provisions; it is also true in the
sample that lump sum contracts are less likely to be capped (5% of the lump sum contracts have caps, 18%
of the non-lump sum contracts).
23 First, calculate the average hourly value of the bonus over the life of the contract, as presented in the
last column of Table 3. Then, let wi be the nominal value of hourly compensation, wages plus bonus, at
the end of the previous contract, w2 the nominal value of hourly compensation at the end of the present
contract, and q the length of the present contract in years. Then, Aw = 100*(In(w 2) - ln(wi))/q.
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Note, however, that Aw is not the ideal dependent variable. It has been suggested that one
of the principal differences between bonuses and wage increases is that the latter go into the base
on which overtime and benefits are calculated while bonuses do not.24 In order to evaluate
whether bonus contracts pay more or less than wage contracts, we want to take into account these
other components of the entire compensation package. Hence, we constructed another dependent
variable as follows. We found the portion of total labor costs accounted for by pensions,
insurance benefits, payment for time not worked, meals, etc. from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce by two-digit industry and the maximum average number of weekly overtime hours by
two-digit industry for the period 1970-1983 from Employment and Earnings; using this
information we inflated the wage portion of the compensation increase, leaving the bonus portion
unchanged.
The variable that we thus obtained, Atc, is a proxy for the growth of total labor cost
incurred by the firm, or, looking at it from the other side, a proxy for the growth of the total
compensation package received by the workers. Yet, it is still not precisely the measure we would
like to have because it exaggerates on average the advantage to the worker of a dollar in the base
wage against a dollar in the form of the bonus within the life of the present contract. This bias is
due to the following reasons. First, it is difficult to determine whether all the benefits we included
are a function of the size of the hourly wage, particularly insurance benefits. Furthermore, the
assumptions about the extent of overtime that we are forced to make for the lack of better data are
quite extreme. Finally, this measure does not take into account the time pattern of payments: we
noted above that most bonus clauses provide for at least part of the bonus payment to come at the
beginning of the contract, so bonuses are probably worth more in present discounted value terms
than similar increases in the base wage over the life of the contract.25 Unfortunately, it is not
possible to adequately compare the present discounted value of two contracts with different lengths
without making a restrictive assumption about the size of compensation following the contract; in
fact, this is exactly the type of assumption we want to avoid, since we do not want to attempt to
estimate the workers' beliefs about the probability of the bonus being terminated.
In short, we believe that Atc, although for our purposes a better measure than Aw, is still
unsatisfactory because on average, within the life of a contract, the growth of traditional wage
system compensation packages is overestimated against the growth of lump sum bonus
compensation packages. The existence of this bias suggests that the correct way to frame our
testing procedure is as a one-tail test in which the null hypothesis is that bonus contracts pay less or
the same amount of money as wage contracts adopted under similar circumstances. If, despite the
24 See, for example, Braxton[1989].
25 E.G. If the contract is one year long, a $365 lump sum payment upon signing is worth more to the
worker than $1 per day over the life of the contract.
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fact that Atc overestimates the growth of compensation in wage contracts, we can still reject the
null hypothesis that bonus contracts provide less or the same amount of money, we will be able to
conclude with confidence that, on average, firms that introduce bonuses do not succeed in cutting
compensation within the life of the present contract. More formally, if despite this bias the
hypothesis Ho: og 0 can be rejected in the equations
(III) Atc = x0 3 + a 31s + F3
(IV) Atc = x$ 4 + a 4fr + E4
we can consider this as convincing evidence consistent with the "bonus as revocable option" story
presented in Scenario III above.26
The matrix x of regressors include industry, region, and year fixed effect dummies as well
as the unemployment rate at the time of settlement, the expected inflation rate at the time of
settlement as determined from a regression of the CPI on two annual lags over the period 1950-
1988, the inflation surprise over the life of the contract if positive for contracts with COLA
provisions, the inflation surprise over the previous contract, the change in the firm's labor force
over the previous contract, and dummies for whether the bargaining unit generally sets or follows a
regional or intra-industry wage bargaining pattern. 27 When we use Is alone as an indicator for the
26 Recognizing that the value of the contract (in terms of growth rate of compensation) and the
existence of a bonus provision are simultaneous outcomes of the same contract negotiation process,
instrumental variable techniques are in principle required to estimate the equations I, II, III and IV in the
text. We instrument for Is and fr as follows. Consider a logit regression on the probability of signing a
lump sum contract (such logits will be presented below); let p be the predicted probability from that
regression. If at least one explanatory variable in the logit regression can be assumed not to be an
explanatory variable in the wage growth regression, we can use p as an instrument for is (see footnote 28).
To get an instrument for fr, we regress fr on the same explanatory variables in the logit regression for the
values of fr such that fr > 0. We then use the coefficients from this regressions to find the predicted value
of fr for all observations. Defining these predicted values as predfr, the following is a valid instrument for
fr: p*predfr if predfr > 0, 0 otherwise.
27 Because our primary concern here is to determine whether bonus contracts are worth more or less
than non-lump sum contracts, we will not attempt to provide detailed arguments for the inclusion of these
variables in the wage equations; these are typical explanatory variables in union wage equations such as
those presented in Vroman and Abowd[1988] and Kochan[1988]. In brief:
- the unemployment rate proxies for the tightness of the labor market and should be negatively
related to the growth rate of nominal wages
- expected inflation should have a positive effect on the nominal settlement to the extent that the
union and the firm bargain over expected real wages
- the inflation surprise over the life of the contract should increase the size of the nominal settlement
for those contracts with COLAs, more for uncapped than capped COLAs
- the inflation surprise over the previous contract should increase the settlement to the extent that
there is compensation for real losses in the previous contract
- the change in the firm's labor force proxies for how well the firm is doing and should be positively
correlated with the size of the settlement
- the existence of wage patterns should increase the size of the settlement to the extent that they
allow unions to "take wages out of competition"; these variables were constructed by Thomas
Kochan and are described in Kochan[1988].
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bonus contract, we test only for whether shifting to the bonus system has an effect on the constant;
using fr allows us to see whether the size of the bonus, not only its existence, has any effects. In
order to determine whether either of these possibilities is clearly predominant, we also ran two
specifications, one for each of the two dependent variables, in which we include both is and fr.
Moving on to our results, Tables 8 and 9 present the estimates from the growth rate
regressions described above.28 Whether the presence of a lump sum provision raises or lowers,
ceteris paribus, the value of total compensation within the life of the contract is indicated by the
sign of the coefficients on is and fr in Tables 8 and 9. Looking at the first four columns of Table
8, in which the dependent variable is Aw, the coefficients of interest are positive and it is possible
to statistically reject that they are negative or zero with a margin of error (p value) not larger than
5% for OLS, 1% for IV.29 In the fifth and sixth columns the two coefficients are still positive, but
statistically not significantly different from zero; this shows that the effect of the size of the bonus
versus the effect of the existence of bonuses independently from size cannot be adequately
distinguished in our data. We conclude that bonus contracts do not provide less money than pure
wage contracts adopted under similar circumstances when only the straight compensation package,
excluding overtime and benefits, is considered.
When total cost growth Atc is considered (Table 9), the coefficients on is and fr are still
positive, but the upper bounds on the margins of error at which we can statistically reject the
hypothesis that they are zero or negative increase to 5% and 14%, respectively, for OLS and 2%
for IV. We still consider this as evidence in favor of Scenario III, although we can say this with
less confidence than in the case of the wage growth equations discussed above. However, in
evaluating these results, recall that Atc is biased against rejecting the hypothesis that bonus
contracts provide less money and this may well contribute to the larger margins of error.
Furthermore, additional evidence against the idea that workers are fooled (one of the variants of
Scenario II) is that ten out of fourteen contracts in our sample that follow bonus settlements
continue with these provisions; if workers had been unaware of the implications of bonuses
regarding overtime and benefits, one would probably expect learning to have occurred.
28 We instrumented for is and fr as described in footnote 26; the identifying variables are dummies for
whether or not another company in the same region or industry had signed a lump sum contract in the past.
We report both OLS and instrumental variables results; we ran specification tests in which we rejected the
hypothesis that OLS is correctly specified in most cases. We do not report other specifications in which we
tried to use firm performance variables in the form of the five-year trend coefficient on sales/assets because
they were not significant and had no effect on the qualitative results on a.
29 The margin of error is 1% for IV when the null is zero and it is lower if the null is less than zero.
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TABLE 8: Determinants of Magnitude of Average Annual Growth Rate of Nominal Wages30
(t-statistics in parentheses)
technique 01s i v Ols i V OIs i V
VARIABLES
constant
unemployment rate in
month of settlement
expected inflation
at time of settlement
inflation surprise over
life of contract, if pos.:
- uncapped colas
- capped colas
inflation surprise
-verI previous contract
growth of workforce
regional pattern dummy
industry pattern dummy
is : lump sum dummy
fr: bonus as a fraction
total compensation
- .320
( .11)
.076
( .23)
.500
(1.70)
1.067
(2.66)
3.832
( .45)
- .093
(, .76)
.072
(7.76)
.308
( .48)
1.054
(2.09)
.881
(1.80)
- 2.062
( .68)
.136
( .39)
.555
(1.84)
1.031
(2.51)
3.973
( .46)
- .091
'7'2
.072
(7.52)
.235
( .36)
(1
.853
.59)
2.289
(2.41)
.113
( .04)
.029
( .09)
.460
(1.56)
.911
(2.19)
3.514
( .41)
- .102
( -84)
.072
(7.73)
.298
( .46)
1.055
(2.09)
.321
(1.64)
-*1.001
( .34)
.016
( .05)
.457
(1.52)
.608
(1.34)
3.166
( .37)
- .117
QA'\
.071
(7.50)
.198
( .30)
.847
(1.58)
.866
(2.41)
- .217
( .07)
.062
( .18)
.488
(1.65)
1.001
(2.33)
3.714
( .44)
- .097
1 '7O\
.072
(7.74)
.298
( .46)
1.037
(2.05)
.635
( .85)
.130
(.44)
- 1.483
( .48)
.060
( .17)
.492
(1.60)
.718
(1.44)
3.404
( .39)
-. 109
( .87)
.071
(7.47)
.193
( .29)
.801
(1.49)
.920
( .61)
.627
(1.11)
N 335 330 335 330 335 330
R squared .42 .40 .42 .-40 .42 .40
30 Including bonuses but not fringes; regressions include
dummies.
industry, region, and year fixed effects
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TABLE 9: Determinants of Magnitude of Average Annual Growth Rate of Total Compensation31
(t-statistics in parentheses)
technique Ols i v ols i v ols i v
VARIABLES
constant
unemployment rate in
month of settlement
expected inflation
at time of settlement
inflation surprise over
life of contract, if pos.:
- uncapped colas
- capped colas
inflation surprise
over previous contract
growth of workforce
regional pattern dummy
industry pattern dummy
Is : lump sum dummy
fr: bonus as a fraction
total compensation
- .064
( .02)
.121
( .34)
.719
(2.35)
.743
(1.78)
3.937
( .45)
.174
(1.37)
.048
(4.99)
.458
(.69)
.505
( .96)
.840
(1.65)
- 2.547
( .82)
.187
( .52)
.795
(2.54)
.716
(1.69)
4.198
( .47)
.172
(1.33)
.049
(4.97)
.386
(.57)
.328
( .59)
2.026
(2.06)
.388
( .13)
.078
( .22)
.682
(2.22)
.641
(1.48)
3.695
( .42)
.168
(1.31)
.048
(4.97)
.463
(.69)
.541
(1.03)
.222
(1.09)
-1.628
( .53)
.080
( .22)
.707
(2.25)
.320
( .68)
3.453
( .38)
.148
(1.13)
.050
(4.91)
.346
( .50)
.306
( .55)
.806
(2.15)
- .118
( .04)
.129
( .36)
.726
(2.35)
.778
(1.74)
4.000
( .45)
.176
(1.38)
.048
(4.99)
.463
(.69)
.514
( .98)
.972
(1.25)
- .070
( .22)
1.95
( .61)
.109
( .30)
.731
(2.28)
.394
( .76)
3.612
( .40)
.153
(1.16)
.049
(4.90)
.343
( .50)
.275
( .49)
.616
( .40)
.645
(1.10)
N 335 330 335 330 335 330
Rsquared .33 .32 .33 .31 1 .31
31 Weights wage increases (but not bonuses) by industry average proportion of payroll accounted for by
overtime and fringe benefits, excluding legally required payments; regressions include industry, region, and
year fixed effects dummies.
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We want to emphasize that the finding that bonus contracts do not provide less than wage
contracts under similar circumstances does not mean that bonus contracts are never concessionary.
What the result does say is that a bonus contract adopted in a concessionary environment will not
provide less than a wage contract adopted in the same concessionary environment, although both
will be concessionary compared to past contracts. Anecdotal evidence also supports the view that
bonus contracts provide more than wage contracts adopted under similar circumstances: in the
negotiations with GM that led to the split of UAW-Canada from UAW-USA, the U.S.
autoworkers accepted a lump sum contract, but the Canadians held out for an increase in the base
wage. GM essentially told the Canadians that they could have an increase in the base wage, but
that they would have to accept less money overall than they would have gotten if they had taken it
in the form of bonuses. 32
In conclusion, our econometric results suggest that bonus contracts do not provide less
money than wage contracts adopted under similar circumstances. This finding leads us to
speculate that when the unions say that they get less money with lump sum bonus contracts, they
are probably not comparing their settlements to what they would have gotten under similar
circumstances if there had been no bonus. Rather, they must be comparing the present contract to
the past when they perhaps got more, or they are thinking about future contracts when the bonus
might be taken away more easily than a wage increase.
4.2 Under what types of circumstances are bonus contracts adopted?
The second question we seek to address is: in what situations are lump sum provisions
more likely to be adopted? Some of the scenarios presented above and interview evidence suggest
that an increase in the uncertainty about the company's future as well as the existence of a
concessionary or expansionary environment in the present should have a positive effect on the
probability of adoption. We can also test for other characteristics of the bargaining unit, such as the
size of the base wage at the end of the previous contract relative to the rest of the industry, and
characteristics of the industry, such as the existence of lump sum provisions in other firms. We
can best address these questions with a logit regression on the probability of signing a lump sum
contract.
In order to test for the importance of firm-specific effects, we merged the contract data set
used so far in the analysis with firm-level data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP and industry-level
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 33 We used the COMPUSTAT and CRSP data to
get proxies for uncertainty and expansionary or concessionary environments as follows. For
32 This anecdote is taken from the documentary Final Offer[--].
33 COMPUSTAT is a computerized data bank containing legally required balance sheet and income data
for publically traded companies; CRSP contains data on stock prices.
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uncertainty, we regressed the ratio of sales to total assets against a constant and a time trend for the
five years preceding the signing of the contract. We then created two variables that we call
"positive variability" and "negative variability". Positive variability is the deviation of sales/assets
from trend in the year before the contract divided by the sum of absolute deviations in the five
years before the contract if this deviation is positive; the variable is zero otherwise. Negative
variability is the same variable for negative deviations in the year before the contract is signed.34
Separating these trend deviations into positive and negative shocks allows us to determine whether
the reaction to these two types of uncertainty (positive and negative) is symmetric. We also created
a "stock market uncertainty" variable which is the variance of excess returns on the firm's stock in
the year before the settlement divided by the variance over the two years before that. We believe
that these variables capture the essence of "uncertainty" in that they do not just measure the value of
the deviation from trend or stock price variability in the year before the contract, but the extent to
which the recent past has been more uncertain than the more distant past. In other words, when
the value of these variables increase, firms are less able to say with much confidence whether they
are moving along the same trend line they perceived in the past or along a different one; to put it
still another way, these variables are designed to capture the concept of a change in environment
which cannot be easily identified as an outlier in the old distribution of events rather than a
movement to a new distribution. To capture whether the firm is more likely to be in an
expansionary or in a concessionary environment, we define two other variables. Positive
performance is defined as the coefficient on time in the above trend regressions if positive, zero
otherwise; negative performance is the absolute value of the same variable for negative coefficients.
A second type of variable we include in our regressions is the ratio of the base wage at the
end of the previous contract to the average industry wage, as measured in the CPS. Some might
want to define concessions as actions designed to bring unusually high wages back into line with
the firm's competitors. If so, we should expect to see bonuses where wages are high relative to
the rest of the industry and thus "concessions" are most appropriate.
We also include two "imitation dummies", one for the four-digit industry and one for the
detailed geographic region (two digit). The industry imitation dummy is equal to one if at least one
other firm in the same industry has signed a lump sum contract one month or more before the
34 More formally the two variability measures are derived from the following expression:
(S/ta)t-1 - trend t-1
E I (S/ta)t-i - trend t-i I
where S = sales, ta = total assets and trend = predicted value from the trend regression. Positive variability is
equal to this ratio if it is positive and zero otherwise; negative variability is equal to the absolute value of
this ratio if negative and zero otherwise.
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contract in question; the geographic imitation dummy is defined similarly. We expect these
variables to be important to the extent that pattern bargaining occurs within industries or regions,
or, alternatively, to the extent that firms in the same industry or geographical region share the same
labor market and so tend to follow the same compensation policies.35
In addition, we include the median age of workers in the industry, as measured in the CPS.
As mentioned above, scenario Ib suggests that young workers might favor bonuses more than
older workers. This variable is also included to get at the issue of expected tenure, albeit in a very
rough manner, since there are good reasons to expect that both very young and very old workers
will have low expected tenure. The number of workers in the bargaining unit is also included
because it is possible that large firms systematically employ different compensation policies.
Finally, we include a constant and industry, region, and year dummies. 36
Tables 10 and 11 present the results of logit regressions on the probability that a bargaining
unit signs a lump sum contract. The dependent variable is equal to one if the contract contains a
lump sum provision, zero otherwise. Table 10 presents the actual coefficients from the
regressions, while Table 11 presents the marginal effects of the variables on the probability of
signing a lump sum contract. 37
Unfortunately, as the tables show, COMPUSTAT and CRSP data do not exist for all of the
bargaining units in the contract data set, so that when the two data sets are merged, more than half
of the observations are lost. An additional problem is created by the fact that COMPUSTAT
contains company-level data while the contracts are at the level of the bargaining unit, so some
measurement error is present, particularly for very large companies. Despite these shortcomings,
the results obtained from merging the two samples are quite revealing.
35 As for the imitative pattern of the adoption of bonus systems, the following is true in our sample:
- 29 of the 66 lump sum contracts came at least one month after another contract with lump sum
provisions was signed in the same four-digit industry.
- 46 of the 66 lump sum contracts came at least one month after another contract with lump sum
rovisions was signed in the same detailed geographic area.
6 We do not report specifications in which we test for the significance of a dummy variable for
whether or not the contract was preceded by a strike. We do have anecdotal evidence that bonuses are
sometimes paid at the beginning of a contract to compensate for pay lost during a strike (for example, the
contract signed by Boston city clerical employees in 1983). If this is the predominant reason for bonus
payments, we should expect the occurrence of a strike before the ratification of the contract to have a
significant positive effect on the probability of signing a lump sum contract. The strike dummy was never
significant, but it probably should not be included in the regression because the existence of a strike may
well be endogenous with the form of the contract; we plan to control for this factor in future research.
37 Note that the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 10 have no direct economic interpretation
because these are the true coefficients divided by the standard error of the regression. On the contrary, the
numbers reported in Table 11 are more easily interpretable in that they represent the increase in the
probability of observing bonuses from changing the variables by the amounts defined in the footnote to
that table. As for statistical significance, the t-statistics in Table 10 are more reliable indicators of the
influence of the variables on the probability of signing a lump sum contract than are the t-statistics reported
in Table 11.
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TABLE 10: Determinants of the Probability of Signing a Lump Sum Contract: Logistic Coefficients
(t-statistics in parentheses)
controls industry industry industry industry industry industry industry
region region region region region region region
VARIABLES year year year year
constant - 37.604 - 40.662 - 63.810 - 63.772 - 60.720 - 182.872 -93.752
(3.01) ( .89) (2.70) ( .79) (2.49) ( .86) ( .91)
# of workers .202 5.843 - .327 11.828 - .251 47.422 31.048
(hundred thousands) ( .36) (1.70) ( .41) (1.12) ( .30) (1.60) (1.13)
median age .987 .354 1.484 - .389 1.389 - .259 -1.613
(of workers in industry) ( 2.88) ( .84) (2.41) ( .25) (2.20) ( .24) ( .83)
avg. firm wage / 1.144 1.155 7.276 20.188 6.876 20.550 25.115
avg. industry wage ( .96) ( .88) (2.40) (2.30) (2.39) (2.56) (2.44)
industry imitation .943 - .781 1.267 .007 1.465 2.287 .697
dummy (1.83) (1.16) (1.49) ( .00) (1.63) (1.16) ( .28)
geographic imitation 1.934 - .014 3.125 .999 2.697 1.694 1.666
dummy (4.08) ( .02) (3.47) ( .60) (3.21) ( .92) ( .82)
stock mkt uncertainty3 : 0.655 1.814 2.533
(1.81) (2.10) (2.18)
positive variability39  1.151 .129 2.436
(1.57) ( 10) (1.21)
negative variability .582 5.09 8.120
( .85) (2.08) (2.17)
ositive performance 43 29.004 131.536 18.784 145.324 115.446
(1.78) (1.54) (1.43) (2.05) (1.82)
1egative performance4  6.252 28.056 2.868 40.234 37.330
( .71) (1.20) ( .32) (1.66) (1.46)
# of Observations 352 352 148 148 162 162 148
# of Lump Sum Contracts 58 58 43 43 46 46 43
log likelihood - 88.98 - 68.81 - 38.63 - 15.89 - 42.08 - 15.96 -11.48
38 The variance of excess returns on the company's stock over the year before the contract divided by the
variance over the two previous years.
39 The deviation of sales (divided by total assets) in the year before contract from the five year trend,
divided by the sum of absolute deviations from trend in the 5 years before the contract, if positive; zero
otherwise.
40 The absolute value of the deviation of sales (divided by total assets) in the year before contract from
the five year trend, divided by the sum of absolute deviations from trend in the 5 years before the contract, if
negative; zero otherwise.
41 The coefficient on five year trend of sales/assets if positive, zero otherwise.
42 The absolute value of the coefficient on five year trend of sales/assets if negative, zero otherwise.
,
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TABLE 11: Determinants of the Probability of Signing a Lump Sum Contract: Marginal Effects43
(t-statistics in parentheses)
controls industry industry industry industry industry industry industry
region region region region region region region
VARIABLES year year year year
# of workers .0000 .0004 - .0000 .0004 - .0000 .0014 .0007
( .36) (1.74) ( .41) (1.14) ( .30) (1.69) (1.20)
median age .0893 .0230 .1366 - .0130 .1257 - .0079 - .0376
(of workers in industry) (2.75) ( .82) (2.46) ( .25) (2.22) ( .24) ( .79)
avg. firm wage / .0091 .0073 .0633 .0645 .0590 .0618 .0640
avg. industry wage ( .94) ( .88) (2.47) (2.98) (2.45) (3.79) (2.45)
industry imitation .0869 - .0444 .1185 .0002 .1396 .0772 .0164
dummy (1.62) (1.30) (1.36) ( .00) (1.47) (1.23) ( .27)
geographic imitation .1861 - .0009 .3281 .0340 .2845 .0547 .0439
dummy (3.79) ( .02) (3.82) ( .59) (3.10) ( .91) ( .72)
stock mkt uncertainty .0610 .0622 .0702
(1.79) (2.56) (2.20)
positive variability .0295 .0012 .0173
negative variability .0123 .0401 .0661
( .78) (2.08) (1.95)
positive performance .0323 .0653 .0236 .0588 .0442
(1.75) (1.51) (1.44) (2.03) (1.30)
negative performance .0157 .0318 .0066 .0386 .0282
( .69) (1.34) ( .32) (2.00) (1.51)
# of Observations 352 352 148 148 162 162 148
# of Lump Sum Contracts 58 58 43 43 46 46 43
log likelihood - 88.98 - 68.81 - 38.63 - 15.89 - 42.08 - 15.96 -11.48
The number reported is the average change in the probability of observing a lump sum contract if:
- the number of workers increased by 100 in each company
- the median age increased by 1 year in each industry
- each company's average base wage increased by 10% of the average industry wage.
- each company went from having no followers to having a follower
- the positive variability, stock uncertainty and positive performance variables increased in absolute
terms by one sample standard deviation, conditional on being positive
- the negative variability and negative performance variables increased in absolute terms by one
sample standard deviation, conditional on being negative.
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Considering the last five columns of Table 10, the uncertainty measures appear to
significantly affect the probability that a bonus contract is signed. Positive variability has more
explanatory power (a larger t-statistic) within industry and region (column 5), but this might
mainly be due to the fact that most of the lump sum contracts came in the later eighties when times
were relatively better than in the early eighties. When we control for this effect by including year
dummies as well (columns 6 and 7), the positive variability measure loses statistical significance
and the negative variability measure gains explanatory power. The stock price uncertainty measure
appears to have explanatory power both within and across years (columns 3, 4 and 7).
In terms of marginal effects, looking at Table 11, a one standard deviation increase in
positive variability increases the probability of signing a lump sum contract by 3.0 percentage
points (after controlling for industry and region). The same variation in negative variability
increases the probability by 4.0 - 6.6 points (after controlling for industry, region and years). A
one standard deviation increase in stock uncertainty raises the probability by more than 6
percentage points whether or not we control for years. Including all three measures of uncertainty
(column 7) does not seem to diminish the effect of any of them; the stock market and product
market measures of uncertainty appear to contribute to the probability of signing bonus contracts
independently from each other. We conclude from these results that the more uncertain a firm's
environment (i.e. the larger the deviation of sales/assets from trend in the year before the contract
compared to the five years before the contract or the larger the variance of excess returns of the
firm's stock compared to the recent past), the more likely it is that the firm will shift to a lump sum
bonus contract.
Turning to the proxies for the existence of an expansionary or concessionary environment,
a worsening of negative performance increases the probability of signing lump sum bonus
agreements after controlling for industry, region and year. We interpret this result as supporting the
hypothesis that bonuses are more likely to appear in concessionary environments, along the lines
described in Scenario IIIc above. However, an increase in positive performance also significantly
increases the probability of signing lump sum contracts both within industries and regions and after
controlling for years as well. Insofar as we can infer from a positive trend on sales/assets in the
past that the firm will be hiring in the future and so will reap the benefits of imposing a subtle two-
tier system soon, we take this as tentative evidence in favor of Scenario IIb. In short, these
results suggest that both firms that are doing very well and firms that are doing very poorly are
more likely to adopt bonus systems, ceteris paribus, while firms that are not doing either
remarkably well or poorly seem to be less likely to introduce them.
The next interesting result concerns the coefficient on the relative wage, which is positive
and significant for five of the seven specifications (it is not statistically significant when the
COMPUSTAT and CRSP variables are excluded, but is still positive). A marginal increase of
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10% in the real base wage at signing relative to the average industry wage increases the probability
of signing a bonus contract by 0.7 - 6.5 percentage points, depending on the specification (Table
11). This provides weak evidence for the version of the "concession theory" of bonuses
according to which they appear where the base wage is high and so serve to bring it back into line
with the firm's competitors.
The median age is positive and significant in three of the specifications, when we do not
control for years. This suggests that bonuses are more likely to appear where the workforce is
older, which contradicts the prediction of scenario IITb that bonuses should appear where there are
more young workers. This is an interesting result, although it probably does not adequately
address the key issue of expected tenure. We wonder whether there is some reason that older
workers might prefer bonuses or whether there is some characteristic of industries which employ
older workers (and perhaps are not hiring young workers) which leads the firms within them to
favor bonuses.
The geographic imitation dummy has a lot of explanatory power within industries and
regions; the industry imitation dummy somewhat less. Not only are they generally statistically
significant, they also increase the probability by a great deal: going from having no predecessors
with bonus contracts within the same industry to having at least one increases the probability of
signing a lump sum contract by 8.7 - 14.0 percentage points, while for geographic region, the
increase ranges from 18.6 - 32.8 points (Table 11). When we control for years as well, these
effects goes away. This is not surprising for the industry imitation dummy, since many of the
contracts in the same industry (e.g. aerospace, automobiles) are negotiated in the same year, and so
any imitation effect should be swamped by a year effect; the fact that the year dummies also swamp
the geographic imitation dummy is more puzzling. On balance, we take these results as evidence
that some sort of "patterning" is occurring.
In summary, the logit results indicate that bonus systems do not systematically appear in
large firms and are more likely to appear where the workforce is older. There is evidence that they
are associated with concessionary environments, in that they appear where the base wage is high
relative to the rest of the industry and when performance is down. These provisions also seem to
show up in firms that are doing particularly well. There is evidence that there is pattern bargaining
occurring in the sense that bargaining units are more likely to adopt them if another bargaining unit
in the same industry or region has done so in the past. Finally, "uncertainty", in the form of an
unusually large shock in the year before the contract, tends to increase the probability of a lump
sum settlement.
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Con clusions
This paper has presented evidence on the prevalence of compensation innovations and has
analyzed one of them, lump sum bonuses, in depth, because of its growing diffusion and neglect
by researchers until now. Possible scenarios explaining the basic nature and causes of bonus
systems have been laid out, and empirical evidence designed to distinguish among them has been
presented. The estimation of wage growth equations shows that variables indicating the presence
and the size of bonuses have positive coefficients; this suggests that the adoption of a bonus
system is most likely not just a short-run tactic to cut labor costs within the present contract, but
rather a more sophisticated arrangement such that any cost savings for the firm can only be
anticipated for the future when the bonus may be discontinued in subsequent agreements. In
particular, within a concessionary environment, these results suggest that workers, while perhaps
receiving less than what they were getting in the past, still receive more than what they would have
gotten in the same concessionary environment under a traditional wage contract. Logit regressions
indicate that increases in uncertainty significantly raise the probability of signing bonus contracts.
While none of the evidence presented is conclusive in itself, taken together these results support the
view that bonuses can be understood as pay increases on which the firm maintains an option of
non-renewal. Present workers must consequently be compensated for this option, the value of
which increases with uncertainty, largely at the expense of future workers. If this line of reasoning
is accurate, it allows us to interpret the apparently puzzling fact that unions generally vehemently
oppose bonus systems but can rarely generate strikes against them: while portions of the existing
workforce, particularly young and low tenure workers, might favor these systems, unions may
well oppose them on behalf of yet-to-be-hired workers and the remainder of the present workforce.
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